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EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CASES INVOLVING BATTERED 
WOMEN WHO KILL:  GOING BEYOND THE BATTERED 
WOMAN SYNDROME 
CHERYL A. TERRANCE,* KARYN M. PLUMM,** KATLIN J. RHYNER*** 
ABSTRACT 
In cases involving battered women who kill their abusive partners and 
claim self-defense, expert testimony may be introduced in order to help the 
triers of fact understand the experiences and context within which some 
battered women resort to lethal force.  Traditionally, expert testimony 
frames the experiences of battered women using the battered woman 
syndrome (BWS).  Despite being routinely admitted within the courtroom, 
this evidence risks advancing a stereotypical and pathological 
characterization of battered women.  This representation risks not only 
negating claims advanced by women whose experiences deviate from the 
BWS standard, but is likely to be inconsistent with a defense that requires a 
determination of reasonableness in order to be successful.  As an 
alternative, social agency expert testimony frames the experiences of 
battered women within a wider social context by focusing less on a 
psychological profile and more on the social realities that face battered 
women.  To provide context to these issues, Part II of this Article will 
outline the status of self-defense law in North Dakota.  Part III will 
summarize BWS and consider its use in cases where self-defense is 
advanced.  Part IV will address empirical research findings collected from 
social psychological research as it relates to both the BWS and consider an 
alternative framework for expert testimony.  Specific recommendations are 
provided in Part V.  Finally, in Part VI, we conclude that expert testimony 
which addresses the social context within which some battered women may 
resort to lethal force is better suited to represent a woman’s use of lethal 
force as reasonable and justified. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Violence against women by intimate partners has been identified as a 
serious social problem in the past two decades.  On an annual basis, an 
estimated 1.3 million American women are victims of male-perpetrated 
intimate partner violence.1  During 2011, in North Dakota alone, 5,159 
incidents of domestic violence were reported to crisis intervention centers, 
with ninety-four percent of the victims being women.2  At some point in an 
abusive relationship, some women may resort to the use of deadly force 
against their abuser.  Investigations of these women suggest that they had 
been subject to more frequent attacks and sustained more severe injuries 
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1. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IV (2000) https://www ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf. 
2. Domestic Violence Statistics, NORTH DAKOTA COUNCIL ON ABUSED WOMEN’S SERVICES 
(Feb. 2012), http://www ndcaws.org/facts/domesticviolence/domesticviolence/stats.html (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2012). 
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than battered women who did not kill their partners.3  The motive of these 
women is therefore purported to be self-defense.4 
Part II of this Article outlines the status of self-defense law in North 
Dakota and addresses challenges battered women face when entering this 
defense.  Part III summarizes the BWS and considers its use in cases 
involving claims of self-defense.5  Part IV will discuss findings gleaned 
from social psychological research and argue that the introduction of BWS 
evidence works against the goals of expert testimony in these cases.  As an 
alternative, expert testimony that can better contextualize the circumstances 
surrounding the use of lethal force by battered women while avoiding the 
difficulties inherent within BWS evidence is considered.  Despite the 
problems associated with BWS evidence, it is recognized that expert 
testimony remains a valuable instrument in cases involving battered women 
advancing claims of self-defense.  As such, Part V considers specific 
recommendations for the continued use of expert testimony in the 
courtroom.  In Part VI, we conclude that expert testimony shift its focus 
from the individual pathology model advanced within the BWS onto the 
social context within which battered women live.  In so doing, this form of 
testimony would be better suited to represent a battered woman’s use of 
lethal force as reasonable and justified. 
Self-defense is premised on the principle that one who was unlawfully 
attacked by another should be able to take reasonable steps to defend him or 
herself.6  In cases involving battered women, self-defense justifies the 
woman’s actions, as opposed to an insanity or mental impairment defense, 
which excuses a woman’s behavior because of some form of mental 
illness.7  Exoneration of female perpetrators using the self-defense plea has 
 
3. Ann Goetting, Patterns of Marital Homicide:  A Comparison of Husbands and Wives, 20 
J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 341, 348 (1989); ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL (1980). 
4. MARGO I. WILSON & MARTIN DALY, HOMICIDE (1988); Margo I. Wilson & Martin Daly, 
Who Kills Whom in Spouse Killings? On the Exceptional Sex Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the 
United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 206 (1992). 
5. Lauren Champaign, Criminal Law Chapter:  Battered Woman Syndrome, 11 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 59, 59-60 (2010): 
Today, every jurisdiction accepts expert testimony on BWS to support claims of self-
defense, and several states have codified its use.  As the legal system has become more 
accepting of the BWS defense in criminal cases, courts have also begun to allow the 
introduction of expert testimony by prosecutors in domestic violence and child 
custody cases.  Id. 
6. Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-
Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 123 (1985); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 240 (2001). 
7. Crocker, supra note 5, at 130; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL 
LAW 454-56 (2d ed. 1986); see also DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 233-34. 
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met with limited success.8  This is especially the case in non-
confrontational homicides—for example, when a woman attacks during a 
lull in the violence, or when her husband is asleep.9 
Difficulties that have arisen in the successful application of the self-
defense plea in these cases are twofold.  First, the laws of self-defense are 
argued to be discriminatory.10  Historically, formulated in terms of male 
experience, the criteria have been criticized as failing to account for the 
experiences of battered women.11  Second, juries are said to hold a number 
of myths and misconceptions regarding battered women.12  These beliefs 
may further hinder application of self-defense criteria to the circumstances 
under which some battered women resort to lethal force. 
In light of these obstacles, expert witness testimony may be 
introduced.13  The purpose behind admitting expert testimony is to educate 
jury members, enabling them to understand and evaluate the facts so that 
they may form their own opinions as to how the issues should be decided.14  
 
8. See generally Crocker, supra note 5 (discussing the legal obstacles facing battered women 
who advance claims of self-defense); see also Gena Rachel Hatcher, The Gendered Nature of the 
Battered Woman Syndrome: Why Gender Neutrality Does Not Mean Equality, 59 N. Y. U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 21 (2003-2004); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense:  Correcting a 
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 13 (1986). 
9. Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. 
L. REV. 427, 436 (1987); see also Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers:  Some 
Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457 (2006); Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-
Defense:  Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 382 
(1991). 
10. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women:  Sex Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 624-27 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, Equal Rights]; 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 114-18 (2000) 
[hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN]. 
11. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE:  BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, 
AND THE LAW 98-100 (1989). 
12. See, e.g., Bonnie E. Carlson & Alissa Pollitz Worden, Attitudes and Beliefs About 
Domestic Violence: Results of a Public Opinion Survey, 20 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE. 1197, 1206 
(2005); Mary Dodge & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Conceptions of Battered Women, 6 
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS, 271, 272 (1991); Charles P. Ewing & Moss Aubrey, Battered Woman 
and Public Opinion:  Some Realities About the Myths, 2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257 (1987); Edith 
Greene et al., Jurors’ Knowledge of Battered Women, 4 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 105 (1989); Schneider, 
Equal Rights, supra note 9, at 624-30; Alissa Pollitz Worden & Bonnie E. Carlson, Attitudes and 
Beliefs About Domestic Violence:  Results of a Public Opinion Survey, 20 J. INTERPERS. 
VIOLENCE, 1219 (2005). 
13. See Kathleen J. Ferraro and Noel Bridget Busch-Armendariz, The Use of Expert 
Testimony on Intimate Partner Violence, VAWNET APPLIED RESEARCH FORUM:  THE NATIONAL 
ONLINE RESOURCE CENTER ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, at 4-7 (Aug. 2009) 
http://new.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/AR_ExpertTestimony.pdf (discussing the variety of 
roles of expert witnesses in criminal trials:  self-defense, duress, prosecution of batterers, failure to 
protect), marital dissolution and child custody cases, tort cases and immigration). 
14. Maguigan, supra note 8, at 452 (“expert testimony about the effects of a history of abuse 
have been ruled admissible by the vast majority of appellate courts that have confronted the 
question.”); see also Jennifer G. Long, Introducing Expert Testimony to Explain Victim Behavior 
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In cases involving battered women charged with the murder of their partner, 
expert witness testimony is usually proffered to provide a framework from 
which battered women’s experiences and actions may be understood.15  In 
this way, expert testimony can help fact-finders reconcile seemingly 
discrepant self-defense criteria with cases where they would not otherwise 
do so.16 
This Article examines the use of expert testimony, and in particular, 
testimony based on the battered woman syndrome (BWS) in cases 
involving battered women charged in the murder of their abusive male 
partners.17  Despite recommendations to adopt the term “battering and its 
effects” instead of BWS,18 states remain divided as to whether they 
acknowledge and apply either the BWS, or the term “battering and its 
effects.”  Consequently, the introduction of syndrome-based evidence 
persists within the courtroom.19 
 
in Sexual and Domestic Violence Prosecutions, AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
12 (2007), www ndaa.org/pdf/pub_introducing_expert_testimony.pdf (noting that expert testimony 
relating the experiences and behaviors of victims of domestic violence may be introduced on 
behalf of both the defense and prosecution). 
Prosecutors who seek to introduce expert testimony relevant to sexual and domestic 
violence victim behavior do so for different purposes than defense attorneys.  
Specifically, defense attorneys offer expert testimony to excuse, justify or mitigate 
their clients’ ‘criminal’ behavior.  Prosecutors, on the other hand, seek to introduce 
expert testimony to dispel myths and misconceptions so that a victim’s puzzling but 
non-criminal behavior can be fairly evaluated, i.e., to provide an accurate context in 
which to assess a victim’s behavior.  Id. 
15.  Cara Cookson, Confronting our Fear:  Legislating Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome 
and the Law of Self-Defense in Vermont, 34 VT. L. REV. 415, 433 (2009); Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on 
Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 198-99 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Women’s Self-
Defense Work]. 
16. Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis:  Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal 
Cases, in THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS:  REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN ACT 3 (1996), https://www ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/batter.pdf: 
Expert testimony on battering and its effects is most readily accepted by state courts in 
cases involving traditional self-defense situations, i.e., it has been accepted by ninety 
percent of the states in such circumstances.  Expert testimony has also been admitted 
by a substantial number of state courts in nontraditional self-defense situations, such 
as where a battered woman kills her batterer while he is sleeping (accepted by twenty-
nine percent of the states) or by hiring a third party to kill him (accepted by twenty 
percent of the states).  Id. 
17. Hatcher, supra note 7, at  28-29; see also infra Part II. 
18. Parrish, supra note 15, at vii.  According to Meredith H. Larson, Assistant State’s 
Attorney, Grand Forks County, Grand Forks, N.D., this recommendation is consistent with the 
trend among prosecutors across the nation to avoid BWS terminology when prosecuting 
perpetrators of violence; see also Long, supra note 13, at 47 (advising that syndrome-based 
explanations of victim behavior be avoided in criminal prosecutions). 
19. See generally Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Words Change, but the Melody Lingers:  The 
Persistence of the Battered Woman Syndrome in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women, 9 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 110 (2003) (discussing the continued use of the BWS construct in 
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Terminology notwithstanding, insofar as expert testimony continues to 
relay a discussion of battering and its effects using syndrome-based 
nomenclature, critical examination of BWS evidence remains relevant as it 
relates to self-defense doctrine.  Specifically, regardless of the term used, 
expert testimony discourse continues to emphasize the psychological 
consequences of abuse.  Consideration of social science research 
concerning the impact of BWS testimony can thus provide insight into 
aspects of syndrome-based expert testimony that may be problematic. 
II. SELF-DEFENSE DOCTRINE AND BATTERED WOMEN WHO 
KILL 
Self-defense is premised on the principle that a person who is 
unlawfully attacked by another should be able to take reasonable steps to 
defend themselves against that person.20  Although wording of the doctrine 
varies across jurisdictions, most require that three conditions be met for a 
plea of self-defense to be entered.21  First, evidence surrounding the case 
must support the plea of self-defense as reasonable.22  Second, the 
individual must have held a reasonable and honest belief of death or 
imminent threat.  Finally, the defendant must have used reasonable force in 
self-defense.23  In some jurisdictions, including North Dakota, defendants 
must also show that they were unable to escape, or retreat, from the 
attack.24  There is no justification for deadly force if it can be avoided.25 
The doctrine of self-defense is meant to apply equally to all persons 
regardless of gender, and on the surface, it does not seem to discriminate.  
Still, legal feminist scholars have argued that the doctrine of self-defense 
was historically formulated in terms of male experience.26  Historically, the 
paradigmatic scenario for which the doctrine of self-defense was originally 
designed for was that of two men involved in an unwarranted assault or a 
 
criminal and civil cases despite criticism against its introduction in the courtroom); Ferraro & 
Busch-Armendariz, supra note 12, at 2; Long, supra note 13, at 24 (stating, “In many 
jurisdictions, it is still common practice for expert testimony on victim behavior to be introduced 
as BWS. . .or an evaluation that the victim’s behavior is consistent with [this syndrome].”). 
20. Crocker, supra note 5, at 123. 
21. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 240. 
22. Id. at 245-46. 
23. Id. 
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(b)(2) (2011). 
25. Id. 
26. GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 98-100; Fiona E. Raitt & M. Suzanne Zeedyk, Review 
Essay, The Implicit Relation of Psychology and Law:  Women and Syndrome Evidence, 623 
SEXUALITIES, EVOLUTION  & GEN. 209, 213-14 (2004); SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra 
note 9, at 79-82, 116-18. 
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fistfight brawl.27  The underlying assumptions of self-defense as it 
developed were that such an altercation was a one-time violent quarrel 
between two men who were strangers and who were of equal size and 
strength.28 
Feminist legal scholars contend that the present day doctrine of self-
defense, as the courts have currently interpreted it, has changed little from 
the time it was developed.29  Application of male-centered self-defense 
criteria have been criticized as failing to accommodate the self-defense 
claims of battered women who kill their abusive partners.30  For instance, 
the concept of imminent danger is based on face-to-face violent 
confrontations involving male adversaries or attacks by strangers.31  As 
such, it has been argued the self-defense doctrine does not take into account 
the cumulative effects of repeated violence, or the prediction of violence in 
the future.32  Furthermore, women who have killed their batterers may have 
often done so during a lull in the violence, at a calmer, safer period.33  As 
“imminent” has been defined by some courts to mean “immediate,”34 a 
 
27. GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 31-49. 
28. Id. 
29. Raitt & Zeedyk, supra note 26, at 213; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 9, at 623. 
30. Raitt & Zeedyk, supra note 26, at 69; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 9, at 23; 
Schneider, Women’s Self-Defense Work, supra note 14, at 198. 
31. GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 98-100. 
32. See generally ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (The Free Press ed. 
1987) (discussing the experiences of battered women who have resorted to the use of lethal force 
against their batterers). 
33. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 5, at 139 (claiming that the majority of appellate opinions 
addressing admissibility of expert testimony arose from nontraditional confrontation cases); David 
McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica:  A New Approach to the Admissibility of 
Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 49 (1987) 
(“[t]ypically, when the woman strikes back, she is not in what most people would consider 
immediate danger at the time she killed her abuser.”); Jill S. Talbot, Note, Is Psychological Self-
Defense: A Solution to the Problem of Defending Battered Women Who Kill? 45 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1527, 1528-29 (1988) (“[a]lthough some women who kill their spouses in the midst of 
battering incidence can show an imminent threat of serious injury or death, many battered women 
kill their spouses during a lull in the violence, perhaps even when their spouses are asleep.”). 
The assertion that the majority of battered women kill in non-confrontational situations has been 
challenged.  Examination of appellate decisions published between 1902 and 1991 led Maguigan 
to conclude that the majority of women kill their abusers during a confrontation.  Maguigan, supra 
note 8, at 391-97.  See also Alan J. Tomkins, et al., Self-Defense Jury Instructions in Trials of 
Battered Women who Kill Their Partner, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT, CURRENT 
TRENDS AND EVALUATION 258-85 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (noting in recognition of the futility 
of a self-defense plea in non-confrontational cases, plea bargains may be advanced or alternate 
legal strategies may be employed.  Therefore, in comparison to confrontational cases, relatively 
few non-confrontational cases would be appealed, and those that are, are unlikely to rest on the 
issue of self-defense.  Consequently, Maguigan’s survey of appeal cases to identify non-
confrontational cases may have underestimated the frequency of self-defensive actions taken by 
women during non-confrontational situations). 
34. Robert F. Schopp, et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the 
Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 45 U. ILL. L. REV. 65 (1994) (quoting BLACK’S 
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battered woman’s use of lethal force during circumstances not traditionally 
defined as a confrontation is likely to be viewed as unjustified.35 
Likewise, the criterion of reasonable force does not take into account 
the disparity in physical size and strength of the woman and batterer.  
Battered women often have to rely on a lethal weapon for protection against 
an abuser who often has the advantage in physical size and strength.36  The 
inherent bias of the reasonable force requirement has been acknowledged in 
some courts.  For instance, the judge noted in State v. Wanrow37 that the 
jury instructions of reasonable force: 
[l]eaves the jury with the impression that the objective standard to 
be applied is that applicable to an altercation between two men.  
The impression created - that a 5’4” woman with a cast on one leg 
and using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel a 6’2” 
 
LAW DICTIONARY 749, 750 (6th ed. 1990)) (“[A]n imminent danger” is an “immediate danger, 
such as must be instantly met.”). 
35. Maguigan, supra note 8, at 414 (noting in terms of the choice between “imminence” and 
“immediacy, “[i]t primarily affects, (1) the instructions given a jury regarding the significance of 
that that evidence, and (2) the scope of expert testimony.”); Id. at 415. 
A battered woman defendant in an ‘imminent’ jurisdiction is more likely than her 
counterpart in an “immediate” jurisdiction to get jury instruction specifically on the 
relevance of the decedent’s past violence . . . The instruction explains to the jurors that 
the evidence of the decedent’s past violence should be considered as they evaluate the 
defendant’s past violence should be considered as they evaluate the defendant’s state 
of mind and the reasonableness of the defendant’s perception that the decedent posed 
an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.  Id. 
See also Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 9, at 634-35 (“When the imminent danger rule is 
interpreted to preclude admission of evidence of the prior relationship and the abuse a woman has 
suffered, the jury is unable to understand why the woman believed herself to be in danger.”); see, 
e.g., People v. Moore, 275 P.2d 485, 486 (Cal. 1954); People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 431 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978)).  It is an empirical question as to whether pleas of self-defense are viewed as 
unjustified due solely to whether or not a confrontation was taking place at the time of the killing.  
Given the complexity of court trials, isolating the circumstances under which a battered woman 
may resort to lethal force (confrontation vs. nonconfrontation) while holding all other factors 
constant is impossible.  See Maguigan, supra note 8, at 396, stating: 
It is hard to assess the degree of distortion in the confrontation/nonconfrontation 
breakdown resulting from the omission of guilty pleas due to the wide variety of 
factors that incline the prosecution, and the defense to reach a non-trial disposition.  
The probable distortion from the exclusion of dismissals and acquittals, however, is 
easier to assess.  These cases are likely to have included an over-representation of 
confrontation cases, while those leading to convictions are likely to have included an 
over-representation of nonconfrontation cases.  Id. 
See also Diane R. Follingstad, et al., Factors Predicting Verdicts in Cases Where Battered Women 
Kill Their Husbands, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 265 (1989); infra Part IV (for a more thorough 
discussion of jury simulation studies). 
36. Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 9, at 632; Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and 
Its Impact on Jurors’ Decisions in Homicide Trials Involving Battered Women, 10 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 228 (2003); Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-
Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y, 324, 327 (1992) [hereinafter Walker, 
Battered Women]. 
37. 559 P.2d 548, 558 (Wash. 1977). 
            
2012] BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 929 
intoxicated man without employing weapons . . . violates the 
respondent’s right to equal protection under the law.38 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all judges find it necessary to 
draw attention to this biased feature of reasonable force.  As such, it has 
often been left to the common sense of the jury to draw such conclusions. 
A. CHOICE OF REASONABLENESS STANDARDS 
The ultimate consideration in the applicability of the self-defense 
doctrine is whether the defendant’s belief of danger and consequent action 
was reasonable.39  In other words, the reasonable beliefs and perceptions of 
the defendant regarding the situation are at issue.  Even if a battered woman 
defendant successfully meets legal criteria concerning seriousness, 
imminence, and retreat, she must still convince the jury that her belief of 
imminent danger or serious injury, and her response to that danger, was 
reasonable.40  Jury instructions direct the jury as to the standard upon which 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s self-defense actions are to be 
judged.41  Traditionally, courts have distinguished between objective and 
subjective standards of reasonableness.42  In objective jurisdictions, jurors 
are instructed to evaluate the claim of self-defense from the perspective of a 
reasonable person.43  In other words, the apprehension of danger and the 
belief that self-defense was necessary must be reasonable from the 
perspective of a reasonable person.44  A subjective standard involves an 
assessment of how the accused woman construed her situation at the time of 
the incident.45  By requiring jurors to make use of a subjective standard, it is 
only required that the defendant honestly believe theself-defensive action 
was necessary.46  That such a belief on the part of the defendant was 
unreasonable by a hypothetical objective person would not defeat the 
defendant’s claim.47 
The intent of the objective perspective, also known as the reasonable 
person test, was an objective, universal standard against which every 
 
38. JONES, supra note 3, at 286 (quoting Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 558). 
39. See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete:  A 
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 439 (1981). 
40. GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 98. 
41. Maguigan, supra note 8, at 409. 
42. Id. 
43. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 454-55. 
44. Id. 
45. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 39, at 439. 
46. David Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense:  A Legal and 
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 624 (1986). 
47. Id. 
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person’s actions could be measured.48  The guiding principles of an 
objective perspective are those of equality and individual responsibility so 
all persons would be held to the same standards.  Thus, in cases of self-
defense, this would ensure that there was no fluctuating standard against 
which the defendant would be measured.49 
A purely objective standard of reasonableness has been criticized in 
terms of its applicability in self-defense cases in which battered women 
have killed their batterers.  First, the use of an objective standard has been 
criticized on the grounds of not specifically addressing the special 
circumstances surrounding a battered woman’s use of lethal force.50  Thus, 
while expert testimony often refers to the history of abuse suffered by a 
battered woman, the social and economic pressures preventing her from 
leaving, and her fear may not be acknowledged when asking jurors to 
consider what a hypothetical reasonable person would have done or 
perceived under similar circumstances.51  Understanding both the context 
and the perspective in which the woman acted, feminists posit, is essential 
to appreciating the reasonableness of the use of defensive force.52  By 
failing to individualize the standard of reasonableness, the objective 
standard purportedly discourages jurors from viewing these events from the 
perspective of the defendant.  Consequently, it minimizes the likelihood 
that jurors will attend to the defendant’s perception of what was reasonable 
given her circumstances and history.53 
Feminists have also been critical of the formal equality model on which 
the objective standard has been based.54  Such a model calls for the 
elimination of distinctions between the sexes and advances a gender-
neutral, strictly identical, treatment of men and women.55  This model has 
been criticized that it only serves to obscure the social reality and 
inequalities faced by women.56  An objective standard embodies male 
values, and hence, a jurors’ knowledge of what is objective has been male-
 
48. Id.; see also Shirley Sagawa, A Hard Case for Feminists:  People v. Goetz, 10 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 253 (1987). 
49. Maguigan, supra note 8, at 409-14. 
50. Donna Martinson, et al., A Forum on Lavallee v. R:  Women and Self-Defence, 23 U. 
BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 26-29 (1991); SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 9, at 138-43. 
51. Crocker, supra note 5, at 144 -52; Sagawa, supra note 48, at 264. 
52. Schneider, Women’s Self-Defense Work, supra note 14, at 218-20. 
53. Id.; SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 9, at 138-43. 
54. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 9, at 138-43.; Crocker, supra note 5, at 126; 
Sagawa, supra note 48, at 253. 
55. Crocker, supra note 5, at 125 (noting “[t]he objective standard suffers from assuming that 
it is value-free in its determination of reasonable behavior.”). 
56. Id. at 125-26. 
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defined.57  As such, it does not allow for the accommodation of women’s 
experiences and perspectives, and thus serves only to further entrench 
inequality between the sexes.58 
Though theoretically objective in its perspective, different jurisdictions 
have increasingly incorporated elements of subjectivity into the 
reasonableness standard.59  To varying degrees, jurors may be instructed to 
incorporate the defendant’s subjective experiences into their decision-
making process regarding the reasonableness of her actions.60  
Consequently, jurors may come closer to evaluating the self-defensive 
action from the perspective of the defendant.61  The extent to which this 
claim is valid remains disputable. 
Although elements of the woman’s experiences may be considered, an 
objective view of these circumstances may be applied.  Despite being 
instructed to consider “the perception of both apprehension and imminent 
danger from the individual’s own perspective,” an objective standard of 
reasonableness by the jury of these circumstances may be used.62  In other 
words, while a woman’s perspective may be integrated within the 
instructions, this experience may nonetheless have to be objectively 
reasonable.  Therefore, the full relevance of an “inquiry into the accused’s 
own mental state” may only be achieved via instructions which explicitly 
inform jurors to consider the context in which the woman acted, as well as 
her own subjective impressions.63  Accordingly, a subjective standard of 
reasonableness may be better suited to self-defense cases, particularly those 
involving battered women who killed their batterers. 
The perspective from which to evaluate the battered woman’s actions 
varies across jurisdictions.64  In North Dakota, this issue was considered in 
State v. Leidholm.65  In this case, Janice Leidholm was charged with murder 
in the stabbing death of her husband, Chester Leidholm.66  Evidence and 
testimony supported claims that her husband abused her during the 
 
57. Id. 
58. Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 9, at 635-36. 
59. Maguigan, supra note 8, at 410. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 409. 
62. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women who Defend 
Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 149, 155 (1978). 
63. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 39, at 458. 
64. Maguigan, supra note 8, at 409 (noting that the majority of jurisdictions combine 
objective and subjective tests of reasonableness). 
65. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983). 
66. Id. at 813 
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marriage.67  On the evening of the killing, both had attended a party, 
consumed a large amount of alcohol, and an argument ensued.68  Upon 
arriving home, the argument continued, and Janice attempted to call the 
sheriff.69  However, Chester prevented her from using the phone by shoving 
her and pushing her down.70  When Chester had fallen asleep, Janice got out 
of bed, went to the kitchen, got a butcher knife, and stabbed Chester.71  
Chester died within minutes from shock and loss of blood.72  Janice 
Leidholm was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to five years 
imprisonment.73 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held in Leidholm that the trial court 
misstated the law of self-defense by applying an objective standard.74  The 
trial court instructed the jury on the law of self-defense stating: “The 
circumstances under which she acted must have been such as to produce in 
the mind of reasonably prudent persons, regardless of their sex, similarly 
situated, the reasonable belief that the other person was then about to kill 
her or do serious bodily harm to her.”75  The Supreme Court held that a 
subjective standard of reasonableness should have been applied.76  That is, 
the court concluded that the correct statement of the law to be applied in a 
case of self-defense is: 
[A] defendant’s conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably 
cautious person might or might not do or consider necessary to do 
under the like circumstances, but what he himself in good faith 
honestly believed and had reasonable ground to believe was 
necessary for him to do to protect himself from apprehended death 
or great bodily injury.77 
From a subjective standard, when judging the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s beliefs and actions, jurors are specifically instructed to consider 
the social reality of the defendant and adopt the defendant’s perspective.78  
Application of a subjective standard affords fact-finders the opportunity to 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 813-14. 




73. Id. at 813. 
74. Id. at 818. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 818 (quoting State v. Hazlett, 113 N.W. 374, 380 (1907). 
78. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 39, at 445; Irvin B. Nodland, Defending Battered 
Women:  Everything She Says May be Used Against Them, 68 N.D. L. REV. 131, 139 (1992). 
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explicitly consider the characteristics of the accused.79  As noted in 
Leidholm, “[t]he practical and logical consequence of this interpretation is 
that an accused’s actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of a person 
whose mental and physical characteristics are like the accused’s and who 
sees what the accused sees and knows what the accused knows.”80  Despite 
this, myths and misconceptions concerning battering and its effects remain 
prevalent.81  As a consequence, triers of fact may encounter difficulty 
applying subjective standards of reasonableness.  Expert testimony is often 
introduced to educate jurors as to the dynamics and experiences of battered 
women.82 
B. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SELF-DEFENSE 
If admitted, the testimony of the expert typically seeks to establish the 
context within which a battered woman responded.83  Since some battered 
women kill outside the acute battering incidents, legal scholars have noted 
expert witness testimony could be especially helpful in such situations.84  
Accordingly, in situations where a jury would not see any threat or danger, 
an expert witness can help educate how a battering relationship generates 
different perspectives of danger, imminence, and necessary force.85  Under 
such a set of circumstances, expert testimony helps establish how and why 
the battered woman fits into traditional self-defense doctrine.  It also 
 
79. Sagawa, supra note 48, at 257. 
80. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 818. 
81. Carlson & Pollitz Worden, supra note 11; Dodge & Greene, supra note 11; Ewing & 
Aubrey, supra note 11; Greene et al., supra note 11. 
82. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 820, stating: 
The jury’s use of a subjective standard of reasonableness in applying the principles of 
self-defense to the facts of a particular case requires it to consider expert testimony, 
once received in evidence, describing battered woman syndrome and the 
psychological effects it produces in the battered spouse when deciding the issue of the 
existence and reasonableness of the accused’s belief that force was necessary to 
protect herself from imminent harm.  Id. 
Though beyond the scope of this article, the reader is directed to Long, supra note 13, at 28-32 
(concerning qualifying the expert under Section 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence); North 
Dakota Rules of Evidence permit a witness to be qualified as an expert if, based on their 
knowledge, training, education, experience, or skill their testimony would assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.  N.D. R. EVID. 702. 
83. See, e.g., Long, supra note 13; see also Malcolm Gordon, Impact of Evidence 
Concerning Battering and its Effects in Criminal Trials, in THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO 
SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 3 (1996), https://www ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles/batter.pdf. 
84. See, e.g., CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-
DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 34 (1987); Crocker, supra note 5, at 139; Rosen,  supra note 
7, at 43. 
85. Gordon, supra note 83, at 8. 
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attempts to dispel any misconceptions that jurors may harbor about battered 
women and replaces them with a framework that considers the battered 
woman’s unique situation and perspective.86  With this evidence, jurors 
would be better informed to more readily evaluate the subjective 
perspective of the battered woman when she resorted to lethal force against 
her abuser.87  Despite the tendency to admit expert testimony in trials 
involving battered woman who kill, the content of the testimony has been 
the subject matter of much debate within academic and legal circles.88 
For the most part, in attempting to establish how a battered woman 
meets the criteria for self-defense, expert witnesses have often introduced 
BWS testimony.89  The syndrome, while not a defense,90 is traditionally 
offered in a self-defense trial to aid the jury in understanding that, given the 
defendant’s past experience and her perception of danger, her subsequent 
action was indeed reasonable.91  As such, syndrome evidence does not 
represent a challenge to the self-defense doctrine, but rather, “attempts to 
frame the woman’s actions within the existing laws of self-defense.”92  As a 
 
86. Crocker, supra note 5, at 131-35. 
87. Regina Schuller & Patricia Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who Kill:  The Impact of 
Alternative Forms of Expert Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 170 (1996). 
88. Parrish, supra note 15, at vii. 
89. See Jessica Savage, Battered Woman Syndrome, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 761, 763 (2006).  
More recently, in order to encompass a gender-neutral standard, and to more accurately reflect the 
“breadth or nature of the scientific knowledge now available concerning battering and its effects.”  
Parrish, supra note 15, at vii (noting that courts have attempted to refocus expert testimony on 
“Battering and Its Effects” instead of the Battered Woman Syndrome).  Despite this, the 
syndrome-based terminology and framework remains.  See Hatcher, supra note 7, at 28-29 (citing 
cases that have excluded “traditional gendered testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome”); 
see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. § 10-96 (2002) (defining battered spouse syndrome, but explaining that 
this syndrome is also recognized as Battered Woman Syndrome); State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 
811 (Minn. 1999) (observing that expert testimony is useful to aid jury, ambiguous as to whether 
expert testimony is limited to Battered Woman Syndrome, or is totally gender neutral); State v. 
Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 573 (N.J. 1997) (invoking Battered Woman syndrome but stating a rule 
that men could also take advantage:  “our courts have always admitted evidence of a victim’s 
violent character as relevant to a claim of self-defense so long as the defendant had knowledge of 
the dangerous and violent character of the victim.”); Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 n.2 
(N.D. 1995) (acknowledging Battered Spouse Syndrome); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170 (2001) 
(Battered Spouse Syndrome). 
90. Maguigan, supra note 8, at 411 n.111 (noting “[n]o state appellate court has approved the 
use of battered-woman-syndrome testimony to create a completely separate defense.”); Leidholm, 
334 N.W.2d at 820 (noting the trial court instruction correctly pointed out that battered woman 
syndrome is not of itself a defense). 
91. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371-75 (N.J. 1984) (discussing the issue of admitting 
testimony concerning battered woman syndrome). 
92. Regina Schuller, Applications of Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom, 
in VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 115 (Mark Costanzo & Stuart Oskamp eds., 1994); see also 
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 819.  As noted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, instruction by the 
trial court concerning BWS testimony was properly: 
[D]esigned to support Leidholm’s claim of self-defense by focusing the jury’s 
attention on the psychological characteristics common to women who are victims in 
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legal strategy, the benefit of introducing BWS testimony in self-defense 
cases remains unclear.  In fact, the syndrome has been criticized on 
numerous methodological grounds, bringing its scientific status into 
question.93  Moreover, though providing a framework from which an expert 
may educate a jury, the implications of this testimony on juror’s perceptions 
of the defendant has been fiercely debated. 
III. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
Lenore Walker, a psychologist specializing in the treatment of victims, 
formulated a theoretical model that she termed the battered woman 
syndrome.94  The syndrome postulates a cyclical and escalating cycle of 
wife abuse to explain why women remain in abusive situations and why 
they sometimes resort to violence to end abusive relationships.95  The 
theory was derived initially from her work with battered women and 
formulated in large part by interviews originally conducted with over 400 
battered women.96  The BWS, as described by Walker, puts forth two major 
theoretical components:  (1) learned helplessness; and (2) the cycle theory 
of violence.97  Together, these constructs encompass both the pattern of 
violence evident within abusive relationships, and the psychological impact 
of this violence on abused women.98 
Walker’s theoretical concept of “learned helplessness” was drawn from 
the experimental work of psychologist Martin Seligman.99  Seligman 
observed that animals, after being subjected to intermittent and unavoidable 
schedules of shock, no longer attempted to escape from their cages even 
when a route to do so was provided.100  The apparent similarities between 
 
abusive relationships, and by directing the jury that it may consider evidence that the 
accused suffered from battered woman syndrome in determining whether or not she 
acted in self-defense.  Id. 
93. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 46, at 633-43; David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The 
Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 68-77 (1997). 




98. Regina A. Schuller et al., Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence:  The Impact 
of Alternative Forms of Expert Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 36 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 
127, 128-29 (2004). 
99. MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEATH 
21-24 (1975).  This theory was first developed through experiments in which dogs were placed in 
harnesses and subjected to electrical shocks at random intervals.  The experimenters noted that, 
over time, the dogs would not attempt to leave the cage when shocks were administered, even 
when escape routes were made possible.  The dogs, learning that they had no control over the 
shock, eventually lost any motivation to alter their situation.  Id. 
100. Id. 
            
936 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.88:921 
Seligman’s learned helplessness hypothesis and the behavior of battered 
women led Walker to adapt the theory in order to explain the apparent 
passivity of women in abusive situations.101  Walker postulated that the 
unpredictability of repeated beatings leave women with the feeling that they 
have no control over what will happen to them.102  Supporters of the learned 
helplessness construct claim it provides “a psychological rationale for why 
the battered woman becomes a victim and how the process of victimization 
further entraps her, resulting in psychological paralysis to leave the 
relationship.”103 
Repeated beatings, like the unpredictable electrical shocks experienced 
by laboratory animals, “diminish the woman’s motivation to respond.”104  
Battered women eventually learn that they are helpless to prevent future 
violent attacks and become passive.105  According to Walker, the battered 
woman, having generalized her helplessness, does not believe that anything 
she does will alter any outcome.106  This belief makes the battered woman 
particularly vulnerable to symptoms of depression and anxiety.107 
The second component comprising the BWS is the cycle theory of 
violence.  This proposition is a tension reduction hypothesis that maintains 
that incidents of wife abuse occur in a patterned, repetitive manner.108  This 
three-step cycle is composed of the following three stages:  (1) tension 
building; (2) acute battering incident; and (3) kindness and contrite 
behavior.109 
The first phase is characterized by minor physical and verbal abuse 
perpetrated by the abuser, resulting in tension build up.110  The second 
phase, the acute battering incident, results from the growing and unresolved 
tension build up from the first phase.111  Phase two is characterized by 
verbal and physical aggression that can leave the woman physically 
injured.112  This phase is ended when the batterer stops, bringing with its 
termination a sharp psychological reduction in tension.113  The final phase 
 
101. WALKER, supra note 94. 
102. Schuller, supra note 36, at 231. 
103. Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 
525, 525 (1978). 
104. WALKER, supra note 94, at 87. 
105. WALKER, supra note 94. 
106. Id. 
107. Id.; Walker, supra note 103, at 326-30. 
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helps explain why many women remain in such a violent situation.114  The 
behavior of the batterer in this stage is characterized by apologies, showing 
kindness and remorse, and promises that he will never be violent again.115  
Taken together, this cycle of violence establishes an intermittent 
reinforcement schedule that is critical in maintaining the battering 
relationship.116 
Although often presented as a formally defined clinical syndrome, 
BWS is actually not a clinical diagnosis; rather, the syndrome is currently 
one of the traumatic experiences subsumed under the general diagnosis of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) according to the American 
Psychiatric Association.117  Systematic reviews of the literature have 
suggested that as many as sixty-four percent of battered women who have 
sought help from domestic violence programs, and as many as eighty-nine 
percent of those living in shelters, meet PTSD diagnostic criteria.118  As 
with the impact of childhood sexual abuse, the widespread application of 
the PTSD diagnosis is associated with a number of advantages.  For 
instance, the category provides a parsimonious framework by which the 
psychological symptomology associated with battering may be described.  
The disparate symptoms experienced by battered women may be integrated 
and thereby differentiated from other psychological difficulties.119  
Accordingly, the diagnostic category may be relied on in order to determine 
appropriate treatment.120 
Walker asserts that it is helpful to use the PTSD criteria chart when 
presenting the BWS to a judge or jury.121  She contends that as most 
battered women meet the diagnostic criteria, such evidence would aid jurors 
in their understanding of the psychology of battered women.122  More 
specifically within the courtroom, Walker argues that the PTSD category 
 
114. Id. 
115. WALKER, supra note 94, at 96. 
116. Id. at 95-104; WALKER, supra note 94, at 55-70. 
117. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994).  “Traumatic events that are experienced directly include, 
but are not limited to . . . violent personal assault (sexual assault, physical attack, robbery, 
mugging).”  Id.; see also Lenore E. A. Walker, Understanding the Battered Woman Syndrome, 31 
TRIAL 32 (1995). 
118. Jacqueline M. Golding, Intimate Partner violence as a Risk Factor for Mental 
Disorders:  A Meta-Analysis, 14 J.  FAM. VIOLENCE 99, 116-20 (1999); Loring Jones, Margaret 
Hughes, & Ulrike Unterstaller, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 2 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE, 99, 111 (2001). 
119. Mary Ann Dutton, & Lisa A. Goodman, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Battered 
Women:  Analysis of Legal Implications, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L., 215, 220 (1994). 
120. Walker, Battered Women, supra note 36, 327-329. 
121. Id. at 329. 
122. Id. 
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with reference to BWS provides a context from which a woman’s violent 
response to physical abuse may be understood.123  While the escalating 
cycle of violence helps to establish the constant fear and terror that the 
woman feels, learned helplessness helps to illuminate the woman’s 
rationale for remaining with the abuser.124  The symptoms of PTSD, 
particularly the consistent heightened arousal, explicate the sense of 
constant threat and terror experienced even in the absence of direct 
confrontation with the abuser.125  As the cycle of abuse continues to 
establish itself within the relationship, the victim learns to predict both the 
probable period and severity of the ensuing abusive incident.126  Together, 
this explanation is expected to assist in establishing the reasonableness of 
reacting to a non-confrontational incident with lethal actions. 
Despite its admission within the legal setting, the application of BWS 
to battered women has been the subject of much criticism.127  The very 
empirical basis upon which the BWS was drawn has been called into 
question.  Close analysis of Walker’s research provides little empirical 
support for her proposed cycle theory of violence and the learned 
helplessness construct.128  Moreover, Walker’s research design has been 
criticized as containing a number of methodological and interpretive flaws 
that bring her conclusions into question.129 
For instance, in testing the cycle theory of violence, Walker relied only 
upon conclusions drawn from a series of interviews with battered 
women.130  Although such a method may be valid, the use of leading 
questions by the interviewers renders the participants’ responses suspect.  It 
has been suggested that responses may have been the result of hypothesis 
 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 330-34. 
125. Id. at 326-30. 
126. Id. 
127. Michael Riccardi, Battered Woman’s Syndrome Applies to Men Too, Judge Finds, N.Y. 
L.J. (Dec. 8, 1999); People v. Colberg, 701 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (N.Y. 1999).  Although less 
common, courts have begun to recognize a gender-neutral “Battered Syndrome.”  Though less 
scrutinized by legal and academic scholars, the Battered (Spouse) Syndrome has been subject to 
much the same criticism as the Battered Woman Syndrome.  See, e.g., Brenda L. Russell et al., 
Does Ambivalent Sexism Influence Verdicts for Heterosexual and Homosexual Defendants in a 
Self-Defense Case?, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 145, 152 (2009); Brenda L. Russell et al., Self-Defense 
and Legal Decision Making:  The Role of Defendant and Victim Gender and Gender-Neutral 
Expert Testimony of the Battered Partner’s Syndrome, 1 PARTNER ABUSE 399, 403-04 (2010). 
128. Faigman, supra note 46, at 636-40; Faigman & Wright, supra note 93, at 67; Marilyn 
McMahon, Battered Women and Bad Science:  The Limited Validity and Utility of Battered 
Woman Syndrome, 6 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L., 23, 30 (1999). 
129. Faigman, supra note 46, at 636-40; Faigman & Wright, supra note 93, at 67; McMahon, 
supra note 128, at 131. 
130. Faigman, supra note 46, at 636-40; Faigman & Wright, supra note 93, at 76-78; 
McMahon, supra note 128, at 132. 
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guessing on the part of participants.131  Further criticism has been directed 
toward the interpretation of participants’ responses.  For instance, Walker 
derives her evidence of tension building and loving contrition phases from 
interviewers’ interpretations of responses, rather than directly from the 
responses themselves.132  Interviewers, basing their judgment on the open-
ended description and a series of closed-ended questions regarding the 
batterer’s behavior before and after an abusive incident, would themselves 
note whether there was evidence of tension building and/or loving 
contrition.133  Such an arrangement makes the research especially 
susceptible to experimenter bias.134  The empirical foundation supporting a 
cycle of violence is tenuous at best. 
Walker’s adaptation of the learned helplessness concept has also been 
criticized as “suffering from both theoretical inconsistency and the use of 
inadequate research methodology.”135  Quite simply, learned helplessness is 
antithetical to the notion that a woman would use lethal force.136  Moreover, 
the measures relied upon by Walker as indicative of learned helplessness, 
including anxiety, disgust, and hostility, have been criticized as lacking 
theoretical support.137 
Despite the tendency to admit syndrome evidence on the basis of its 
relevance in explaining “a victim’s conduct or testimony to avoid 
mischaracterizations,”138 criticism regarding the reliability and validity of 
the BWS remains.139  Nonetheless, courts generally tend to support that the 
syndrome has gained a considerable scientific acceptance to warrant 
admissibility.140  In fact, the legal recognition of this syndrome testimony 
within the courtroom has been promoted as a way of alleviating the existing 
 
131. Faigman, supra note 46, at 636-40; Faigman & Wright, supra note 93, at 76-78; 
McMahon, supra note 128, at 32. 
132. WALKER, supra note 94, at 96. 
133. Faigman supra note 46, at 637-38. 
134. Faigman & Wright, supra note 93, at 76-78. 
135. Faigman, supra note 46, at 640. 
136. Faigman & Wright, supra note 93, at 79. 
137. Faigman, supra note 46, at 642. 
138. Long, supra note 13, at 21. 
139. See also Parrish, supra note 15, at vii. 
140. People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. 1985); John W. Roberts, Between the 
Heat of Passion and Cold Blood:  Battered Woman’s Syndrome as an Excuse for Self-Defense in 
Non-Confrontational Homicides, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 150 (2003) (“expert testimony 
concerning battered woman syndrome has become more readily admissible under the Daubert 
standard”); see also DRESSLER, supra note at 5, at 243 n.133.  For a discussion regarding the 
admissibility of this form of expert testimony, see Long, supra note 13, at 20-32.  See also Frye v. 
U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Parrish, supra note 15, at 27-34. 
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gender bias in the law on self-defense.141  Such testimony, however, has 
implications that go beyond merely describing a woman’s response to male 
violence. 
IV. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH:  IMPACT OF 
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME EXPERT EVIDENCE 
Methodological criticism notwithstanding, social psychological 
research has examined the impact of BWS testimony on mock juror 
decision-making.142  Briefly, jury simulation paradigms allow researchers to 
present trial material to mock jurors and assess their responses on a variety 
of measures.  Though the presentation of trial material varies, jury 
simulation techniques allow researchers to control extraneous variables, 
while manipulating only the variables of interest.143  In this regard, research 
investigating the impact of expert testimony on juror decision-making in 
cases involving battered women who kill can vary, for instance, the 
presence or absence of BWS evidence.144  Responses of mock jurors and 
juries can then be assessed on a variety of measures, including individual 
guilt ratings, verdicts, and attributions of blame and responsibility.145  By 
adopting this methodology, researchers have been able to systematically 
investigate specific aspects of criticism that has been levied against BWS 
evidence. 
Because jury simulations are research simulations of actual court trials, 
these paradigms are subject to criticism regarding their generalizability.146  
Factors, such as mock juror demographics, the degree to which they are 
invested in the research, and the length of the trial, differ from real court 
cases.147  Undoubtedly, actual court cases are more complex.  However, by 
limiting the complexity of the information presented, jury simulations 
 
141. Walker, Battered Women, supra note 36, at 334. 
142. C.f. Norman J. Finkel et al., The Self-Defense Defense and Community Sentiment, 15 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 585, 586 (1991); Marilyn Kasian et al., Battered Women Who Kill:  Jury 
Simulation and Legal Defenses, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 289 (1993); Karyn M. Plumm, & 
Cheryl A. Terrance, Battered Women Who Kill:  The Impact of Expert Testimony and Empathy 
Induction in the Courtroom, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 186, 192 (2009); Schuller & 
Hastings, supra note 87, at 171; Cheryl Terrance & Kimberly Matheson, Undermining 
Reasonableness:  Expert Testimony in a Case Involving a Battered Woman Who Kills, 27 
PSYCHOL. WOMEN QUARTERLY 37, 38 (2003). 
143. Schuller & Hastings, supra note 87, at 237. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. See, e.g., Terrance & Matheson, supra note 142, at 44. 
147. Id. 
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provide researchers the opportunity to systematically isolate variables, such 
as expert testimony, that appear relevant in the decision making process.148 
A. LIMITATIONS OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME:  EXPERT 
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN VICTIM BEHAVIOR 
In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, National Institute of Justice, and the National 
Institute of Mental Health released a three-part report, entitled The Validity 
and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its Effects in Criminal 
Trials.149  A notable conclusion expressed by all authors was the opinion 
that the term BWS is inadequate at capturing the complexity of the nature 
and dynamics of domestic violence.150  It was also stated that the term BWS 
risks subsuming the responses of all battered women under a single 
construct.151  As a consequence, a stereotypic image of battered women 
may be portrayed.152  Relatedly, concern was raised regarding the potential 
for syndrome-based terminology to advance a pathological characterization 
of battered women.  This in turn was suggested as potentially endorsing a 
view that battered women suffer from a mental deficit.153 
In light of these concerns, it was recommended that expert testimony 
concerning domestic violence relay evidence and move towards adopting 
terminology on “battering and its effects.”154  Despite efforts to adopt 
terminology that more accurately reflects scientific knowledge concerning 
the dynamics and nature of domestic violence within the courtroom,155 
expert testimony still advances a framework that explains women’s 
reactions to violence within a psychological discourse.156  Given the 
persistence of BWS terminology within the courtroom, an examination of 
 
148. For a comprehensive review of jury simulation techniques, see Brian H. Bornstein, The 
Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations:  Is the Jury Still Out? 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 
(1999). 
149. Parrish, supra note 15, at vii. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at viii. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at vii. 
155. Gordon, supra note 83, at 22. 
156. Long, supra note 13, at 41, noting: 
[A] survey of law review articles and case law reveals the common practice of 
describing victim behavior in terms of BWS, RTS [rape trauma syndrome], ‘battering 
and its effects,’ ‘effects of family violence,’ and PTSD in both sexual and domestic 
violence cases.  Confusion exists because, notwithstanding the specific definitions of 
each term, the terms are used liberally and sometimes interchangeably by judges, 
prosecutors, and experts to describe common victim behavior.  Id. 
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social science research concerning the impact of expert evidence that limits 
its focus to the psychological consequences of battering, as advanced within 
the BWS, is warranted.  Indeed, the body of research conducted in this area 
supports the conclusion that the concerns expressed within the 1996 DOJ 
report are not without merit. 
1. The Battered Woman as Pathological 
Rather than providing a framework from which a battered woman 
defendant’s actions may be perceived as a reasonable response, expert 
testimony concerning BWS may persuade jurors to interpret the woman’s 
actions within the context of her “psychological (dys)functioning.”157  
Using jury simulation methodology, research has investigated claims that 
BWS testimony portrays battered women as pathological.  For instance, in 
one jury simulation study, researchers examined how mock jurors utilized 
expert testimony concerning the BWS in a case where a battered woman 
kills her spouse.158  Compared to a no expert control group, this form of 
expert testimony failed to alter verdicts.  However, it did influence how 
mock jurors perceived the defendant.159  Mock jurors, who were provided 
with expert testimony concerning the BWS, viewed the defendant as 
“having less capacity for responsible choice and as being more distorted in 
her thinking.”160 
Empirical evidence also supports the contention that expert testimony 
concerning the BWS is associated with increased perceptions of diminished 
capacity on the part of the woman.161  For example, expert testimony 
detailing the BWS was presented in a simulated jury trial involving a 
battered woman who killed her abusive partner.162  The content of the 
expert testimony was held constant, and the plea entered on behalf of the 
battered woman defendant was varied to reflect a self-defense, automatism, 
or psychological self-defense plea.163  Expert testimony was found to only 
 
157. Julie Stubbs, The (Un)Reasonable Battered Woman?  A Response to Eastreal, 3 
CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 359, 360 (1992). 
158. Finkel et al., supra note 142, at 586. 
159. Id. at 593-600. 
160. Id. at 598. 
161. Kasian et al., supra note 142, at 298. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 299-300; psychological self-defense is a hypothetical plea. 
[A] plea of psychological self-defense would be entered by a defendant in order to 
justify the use of deadly force to prevent a serious and immediate threat to 
psychological well-being.  Ewing defines serious and immediate threat to psych- 
ological well-being as ‘gross and enduring impairment of one’s psychological 
functioning which would significantly limit the meaning and value of one’s physical 
existence. (quoting EWING, supra note 84, at 79). 
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have an impact on mock jurors’ private belief in guilt ratings in the 
automatism condition.164  These findings suggest that expert testimony in 
battered women’s cases is likely useful only under circumstances where the 
sanity of the defendant is called into question.165 
While BWS is implicated in the tendency for jurors to perceive the 
woman as less reasonable in her decision to use lethal force, the 
representation of BWS as a subcategory of PTSD appears to further bolster 
the disordered and pathological portrayal of battered women defendants.  
Using a jury simulation study paradigm, researchers presented mock jurors 
with one of two forms of expert testimony in a case involving a battered 
woman charged with the murder of her spouse.166  More specifically, mock 
jurors were presented with either expert testimony regarding BWS, BWS 
framed within PTSD nomenclature, or a no-expert control condition.167  
Mock juror verdicts failed to differ according to expert testimony 
condition.168  However, both BWS and BWS/PTSD testimony were 
associated with perceptions of the defendant as being “more mentally 
unstable” and “out of her mind” at the time of the killing relative to the no-
expert control condition.169  Moreover, mock jurors presented with the 
addition of PTSD nomenclature were less likely to recognize the 
domination and control of the husband, and mock jurors were more likely to 
perceive the defendant as less mentally fit to raise her child than either the 
BWS or no-expert control conditions.170 
Based upon previous research, concerns that BWS evidence portrays 
battered women as disordered are well founded.  Referencing BWS within a 
PTSD framework appears to bolster the characterization of battered women 
as disordered and pathological.171  This has significant implications for 
claims of self-defense.  In fact, it would be challenging to argue that the 
disordered battered woman that is advanced by virtue of a mental health 
PTSD diagnosis is justified and reasonable in her perceptions and 
actions.172 
 
164. Id. at 305-06. 
165. Id. at 309. 
166. Terrance & Matheson, supra note 142, at 39. 
167. Id. at 40-41. 
168. Id. at 42. 
169. Id. at 43. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 43-44. 
172. Mary Ann Dutton, Update of the “Battered Woman Syndrome”:  Critique, APPLIED 
RESEARCH FORUM, at http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/AR_BWSCritique.pdf , 1, 8 
(2009). 
            
944 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.88:921 
2. The Stereotypical Battered Woman 
Concern has also been directed toward the potential for BWS testimony 
to create a prototypical battered woman stereotype that would replace 
jurors’ misconceptions regarding battered women.173  Battered women do 
not fit a singular profile.174  As a result, the BWS characterization has the 
potential to create a rigid classification that may serve to exclude many 
battered women whose circumstances deviate from the BWS standard.175  
As a consequence, the actions of battered women defendants’ risk being 
evaluated based upon the extent to which their experiences match a 
prototypical battered woman.176  As opposed to clarifying the defendant’s 
behavior and perceptions, the syndrome may be treated as a basis from 
which all battered women must conform.177  Therefore, what risks 
becoming an issue is the extent to which the defendant fits the syndrome. 
The “good” battered woman victim appears to be one who is helpless, 
passive, and has no history of violent or confrontational behavior.178  If the 
accused does not meet the parameters as set out in the BWS categorization, 
she risks not benefiting from the narrowly constructed victim promoted by 
BWS.  Consequently, she may be denied the opportunity of this defense 
and, having reacted to her battering situation in a lethal manner, she will 
likely be judged outside of the framework of that of a typical battered 
woman.179  It is likely the case, therefore, that very little latitude exists 
within the stereotypical version of the battered woman, and thus, the 
diversity of individual experiences of battered women may not be 
accounted for.  In other words, only the experiences of a few so inflicted 
women will benefit as legitimate victims.180 
If, in fact, the legal use of BWS encourages a rigid victim stereotype, it 
is likely to be inconsistent with the realities faced by battered women.  For 
instance, research findings have contradicted the suggestion that the 
 
173. Cookson, supra note 14, at 425-26; Pamela Jenkins & Barbara Davidson, Battered 
Women in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis of Gender Stereotypes, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
161, 167-68 (1990). 
174. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence:  A 
Redefnition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1993). 
175. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering, in REPRESENTING BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 51, 88 (SARA L. 
JOHANN & FRANKLIN M. OSANKA eds., 1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Problem of Expert 
Testimony]. 
176. Crocker, supra note 5, at 149. 
177. Id. at 144. 
178. Jenkins & Davidson, supra note 173, at 169. 
179. Schneider, Problem of Expert Testimony, supra note 175, at 88. 
180. Terrance & Matheson, supra note 142, at 38. 
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behaviors of battered women are indeed passive.181  For example, the 
abused women in Walker’s sample were actively seeking outside help as 
the violence escalated and were not, as Walker suggested, passive.182  In 
fact, the findings of several studies support the fact that battered women 
have been in contact with a variety of social services agencies to get 
assistance.183 
The potential for BWS evidence to advance a stereotypic image of 
battered women as helpless and passive has been previously examined 
using jury simulation paradigms.  In one study, researchers investigated 
whether the portrayal of the woman’s behavior toward the batterer, 
specifically her degree of passivity, would influence the decision-making 
process.184  The woman’s prior response to her husband’s abuse had little 
impact on mock jurors’ verdicts.185  However, there was an indication that 
the degree of correspondence between the woman’s history of behavior and 
the nature of the information conveyed in the expert testimony played a role 
in juror decision-making among male participants.186  Specifically, male 
mock jurors rated the BWS expert testimony as more applicable to the 
passive, as opposed to the active, response history condition.187  This 
finding is consistent with the suggestion that a passive portrayal of the 
battered woman is relayed within BWS testimony.188 
Another jury simulation study examined the degree to which a battered 
woman defendant must be consistent with the standard advanced with the 
BWS framework.189  With increasing numbers of women in the workforce, 
 
181. Lee Bowker, A Battered Woman’s Problems are Social, Not Psychological, in 
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 154-65 (RICHARD J. GELLES & DONILEE R. 
LOSEKE, eds., 1993); EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS 
SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988); Sherry L. Hamby 
et al., Responses to Partner Violence:  Moving Away From Deficit Models, 11 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 
339, 339-40 (1997). 
182. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 181, at 339-40. 
183. Id.; Diane R. Follingstad et al., Effects of Battered Women’s Early Responses on Later 
Abuse Patterns, 7 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 109 (1992); Lisa Goodman et al., The Intimate Partner 
Violence Strategies Index:  Development and Application, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163, 
178 (2003). 
184. Schuller & Hastings, supra note 87, at 170. 
185. Id. at 177. 
186. Id. at 184. 
187. Id. 
188. Champaign, supra note 19, at 72; Schneider, Women’s Self-Defense Work, supra note 
14, at 207; Elizabeth A. Sheehy et al., Defending Battered Women on Trial:  The Battered Woman 
Syndrome and its Limitations, 16 CRIM. L. J. 369, 384-85 (1992). 
189. Terrance & Matheson, supra note 142, at 39. 
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battered women are increasingly included as part of the paid workforce.190  
This being the case, it is also likely that they have access to work cohorts, if 
not family and friends.  This characterization stands in stark contrast to the 
helpless and pathologized battered woman prescribed within the BWS 
discourse, but nonetheless, a woman who is in the workforce represents a 
more accurate portrayal of the context within which many battered women 
live.191  To examine the potential of BWS evidence to support a 
stereotypical victim in terms of financial dependence and isolation from a 
social support network, the degree to which the defendant fits the stereotype 
was varied to reflect either a high or low stereotype fit condition.192  This 
study found that mock jurors provided with BWS testimony were more 
likely to rate the defendant as credible when her circumstances reflected a 
high, as opposed to low, stereotype fit.193 
Further research supports the conclusion that BWS testimony promotes 
a “typical” battered woman standard.194  In this jury simulation study, 
participants were provided with actual case summaries that varied both the 
typicality and passivity of the defendant.195  All participants received expert 
testimony concerning the BWS.196  When the defendant was portrayed as a 
“typical” battered woman, mock jurors were more likely to view the case as 
meeting the requirements of self-defense.197  The passive defendant was 
perceived as having fewer options available to her other than killing and 
was more likely to be viewed as fitting a typology of a battered woman.198  
When the defendant was portrayed as typical and passive, mock jurors rated 
her version of events as more plausible and believed that she had less 
control over her actions at the time of the crime.199  Though this study failed 
to include control group,200 results suggest that judgments of culpability are 
influenced by the extent to which a defendant fits or does not fit the 
 
190. See, e.g., Kara Wettersten et al., Freedom Through Self-Sufficiency:  A Qualitative 
Examination of the Impact of Domestic Violence on the Working Lives of Women in Shelter, 51 J. 
OF COUNSELING 447 (2004). 
191. Terrance & Matheson, supra note 142, at 39. 
192. Id. at 40. 
193. Id. at 44. 
194. Brenda L. Russell & Linda S. Melillo, Attitudes Toward Battered Women Who Kill:  
Defendant Typicality and Judgments of Culpability, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 219,  221 (2006). 
195. Id. at 225-26; People v. Evans, 631 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); State v. 
Goforth, 721 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
196. Russell & Melillo, supra note 194, at 227. 
197. Id. at 234. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 225- 28. 
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typology of a battered woman.201  Consequently, “if the defendant does not 
depict the typical/passive battered woman, then the defendant’s use of 
expert testimony regarding the syndrome may not be a successful 
strategy.”202 
Taken together, these studies suggest that the BWS framework goes 
beyond simply describing battered women’s behavior in response to their 
batterer’s abuse.  Rather, it is prescriptive in terms of defining the particular 
roles that women must adopt, or have adopted, to be justifiably susceptible 
to this response.203  Only to the extent that a battered woman defendant’s 
experiences and behaviors were consistent with the stereotypical image 
supported by BWS evidence were her claims viewed as legitimate among 
mock jurors.204  Particularly troubling is the fact that this standard is 
inconsistent with the experiences of many battered women.  For battered 
women defendants whose experiences deviate from the typology of battered 
women advanced by BWS testimony, their claims of self-defense risk being 
undermined. 
B. AN ALTERNATIVE TO BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME:  SOCIAL 
AGENCY TESTIMONY 
In light of the difficulties associated with the use of BWS/PTSD 
evidence, various alternatives have been suggested.  For the most part, in 
response to concerns arising from the psychological and individualized 
focus BWS testimony, some feminist and legal commentators propose that 
expert testimony shift its focus.205  In particular, it has been suggested that 
the content of expert testimony focus more on the social reality of the 
woman’s situation as opposed to her psychological reactions.206 
In most cases, a battered woman’s behavior is best characterized as 
reasonable within the context of her abuser’s behavior, and not the product 
of a mental health problem.207  Within this “social agency” (“SA”) 
 
201. Id. at 229-39. 
202. Id. at 239. 
203. Cookson, supra note 14, at 426-27. 
204. See Russell & Melillo, supra note 194, at 227; Schuller & Hastings, supra note 87; 
Terrance & Matheson, supra note 142. 
205. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:  Redefining the Issue 
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991); Raitt & Zeedyk, supra note 26, at 20; Schuller et 
al., supra  note 98, at 129; Schuller, supra  note 36, at 27; Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket:  
Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling and Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1332 (1994). 
206. Mahoney, supra note 205, at 4; Raitt & Zeedyk, supra note 26, at 177; Schuller et al., 
supra note 98, at  129; Schuller, supra note 36, at 235-36; Stefan, supra note 205, at 1333. 
207. Dutton, supra note 172, at 8. 
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framework,208 expert testimony need not explain the responses of battered 
women within a syndrome-based discourse in order to help jurors make 
sense of their use of lethal force.209  A battered woman’s reactions, 
including her failure to leave an abusive relationship and use of lethal force, 
are not diagnosed and explained as symptoms of a syndrome, but instead 
are viewed in light of the overall social context.210  Rather than a focus on 
the passive and victimized aspects of women’s experiences, testimony can 
highlight the circumstances that explain the use of lethal force as a 
“necessary choice.”211  A battered woman’s inability to leave an abusive 
relationship is considered within an SA framework as a rational option 
given the numerous obstacles that battered women face.212  Her responses 
then are described as normal, and as such, the pathologized passive and 
helpless characterizations are negated. 
SA testimony can highlight the inadequacies that exist within the 
formal help sources.  For instance, even where mandatory arrest policies 
exist, the police still must make probable cause determinations about 
whether violence has occurred.213  As a result, discretion may result in 
failure to arrest the abuser. 214  Moreover, even if charges are laid, battered 
women still risk facing retaliatory violence in the event that the abuser 
returns.215  A lack of alternatives where a woman may be safe is also 
influential in keeping battered women in their relationships.  In comparison 
to the large number of battered women who require such services, shelters 
remain scarce.216  Consequently, waiting list and time limits must often be 
 
208. Schuller & Hastings, supra note 87, at 171 (coined the term “social agency” testimony). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 170-71; Sheehy et al., supra note 188, at 383- 86 (1992); Stefan, supra note 205, at 
1335. 
211. Schneider, Women’s Self-Defense Work, supra note 14, at 198. 
212. Schuller & Hastings, supra note 87, at 171. 
213. Sara R. Benson, Failure to Arrest:  A Pilot Study of Police Response to Domestic 
violence in Rural Illinois, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 685, 691 (2009) (noting despite 
mandatory arrest laws that have been codified in many states, the Supreme Court has held that 
these laws are still discretionary). 
214. Id.; Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies:  Race, Class, and the 
Politics of the Battered Woman’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 293 (1997). 
215. Dutton, supra note 174, at 1232. 
216. John Michaelson, Housing Crunch has N.D. Domestic Violence Shelters at Capacity, 
PUBLIC NEWS SERVICE (June 13, 2012), at http://www.publicnewsservice.org/index. 
php?/content/article/26911-1.  According to Janelle Moos, executive director of the North Dakota 
Council on Abused Women Services, 
[T]here aren’t enough housing options for women looking to escape abusive situations 
[in North Dakota].  There [are] no apartments or transitional housing that they can go 
to after leaving a shelter, so they’re staying longer at our shelters. So, it’s making our 
programs have to turn other victims away because there’s no room; because they can’t 
move folks out as quickly as they used to be able to.  Id. 
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enforced.217  Battered women may also lack the financial support necessary 
to establish independence from their abusers.218  Some of these women do 
not work, either by choice or by force, and may have limited access to 
finances as the result of the domination and control of the abuser.219  If 
these women have children to care for, they must be certain that they can 
adequately support themselves and their families before leaving can be 
considered as a serious option.220 
Women who work outside the home may also continue to face the 
domination and control of their husbands.  Even with employment, a 
woman is often far from being financially independent.221  Escaping an 
abusive partner often requires flight, which may involve leaving an 
established lifestyle including a job and a regular paycheck.222  
Unfortunately, even if a woman does escape the abusive situation and 
maintains her job, it is not uncommon for the abuser to sabotage the 
victim’s employment with his disruptive behavior.223 
Women who have successfully left an abusive relationship may still 
face retaliation from their abusers.  The commonality of incidents of abuse 
that occur following separation has led to the creation of the term 
“separation assault.”224  It is not uncommon for women who have managed 
to escape the abusive environment to be sought out and abused.  In fact, a 
large proportion of the battered women who are eventually killed by their 
batterer are not living with them at the time of their death.225 
 
Moos states that the twenty-one crisis centers in North Dakota served 4,600 victims of domestic 
violence last year, along with about 900 victims of sexual assault.  Id. 
217. Joan B. Cannon & Jean S. Sparks, Shelters—An Alternative to Violence:  A 
Psychosocial Case Study, 17 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 203 (1989); Leslie M. Tutty et al., 
Residents’ Views of the Efficacy of Shelter Services for Assaulted Women, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN, 898 (1999). 
218. Dutton, supra note 174, at 1231-39 (discussing contextual factors that influence a 
battered woman’s psychological reactions to domestic violence, including fear of retaliation, 





223. Wettersten et al., supra note 190, at 447 (discussing vocational related issues relevant to 
female victims of domestic violence). 
224. Mahoney, supra note 205, at 65-66, stating: 
Separation assault is the attack on the woman’s body and volition in which her partner 
seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to return.  It 
aims at overbearing her will as to where and with whom she will live, and coercing her 
in order to enforce connection in a relationship.  It is an attempt to gain, retain, or 
regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the relationship.  It 
often takes place over time.  Id. 
225. Dutton, supra note 174, at 1232; Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk 
and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 1, 3 (1993): 
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SA testimony addresses the obstacles and lack of alternatives available 
to women in abusive relationships.  This form of testimony can therefore 
substantiate the defendant’s claim that she believed she had no other 
alternative but to kill her abusive spouse without having to excuse her 
behavior as the actions of a woman suffering from a syndrome.226  SA 
testimony locates the explanation for battered women’s reactions within the 
political and social structure.227  In so doing, the blame is diverted from the 
individual.  In this way, women may no longer be assessed according to 
their degree of fit within a standard of victimhood.  This testimony has the 
advantage of “being about men’s behavior not women’s pathology.”228  SA 
testimony may therefore be more consistent with the justification theory of 
self-defense than syndrome-based testimony.  As such, this testimony may 
have implications for not only how the defendant is perceived, but her claim 
of self-defense as well. 
In an examination of mock-juror reactions to a case involving a 
battered woman who entered a plea of self-defense in the murder of her 
abusive husband, the effectiveness of SA testimony relative to BWS 
evidence was evaluated.229  Findings indicated that BWS was associated 
with a pathological portrayal of the defendant.230  In particular, mock jurors 
were more likely to rate an insanity plea as being successful when presented 
with BWS as opposed to SA testimony.231  Importantly, SA testimony was 
not associated with interpretations of diminished capacity.232  Mock juror 
verdicts failed to differ across expert testimony conditions.233  However, 
closer examination of both forms of testimonies indicates that there was 
considerable overlap in the actual content of each form of testimony. 
 
Frequencies of homicide victimization of wives and husbands, while cohabiting and 
when separated, are reported for all spousal homicides known to the police in Canada 
(1974-1990), in New South Wales, Australia (1968-1986), and in Chicago (1965-
1990).  In all three data sets, the degree to which spousal homicide victimization was 
female-biased was significantly greater when the couple were estranged than when 
they were coresiding.  Victim counts and population-at-large estimates of coresiding 
and separated now-married spouses were combined to estimate differential homicide 
rates incurred by coresiding and estranged married persons.  Wives in all three 
countries incurred substantially elevated risk when separated as compared to when 
coresiding.  Id. 
226. Stefan, supra note 205, at 1298-99. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 1335. 
229. Schuller & Hastings, supra note 87. 
230. Id. at 184. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 185. 
233. Id. at 181-85. 
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Within the SA testimony, although the expert did not refer to a 
“syndrome,” testimony did describe the cycle theory of violence.234  
Arguably, though the explicit “pathologizing” syndrome element of BWS 
was excluded, the cycle theory of violence risked conveying the impression 
that all intimate partner violence occurs in a patterned, repetitive fashion.  
Consequently, the testimony may still have endorsed a stereotypical 
characterization of the experiences of battered women. 
Even in its more “pure” form, SA testimony may be limited in that it 
conveys only a description of the context within which battered women live 
and the barriers that make it difficult for them to leave their abusive 
relationship.  This concern was supported by the findings reported in a jury 
simulation study that varied alternative forms of expert testimony (SA 
versus BWS versus no expert control) in a case involving a battered woman 
charged in the murder of her abusive partner.235  Mock jurors receiving SA 
expert testimony found the battered woman defendant to be less guilty after 
hearing the testimony than either the BWS or control conditions, and also 
rated the defendant as having fewer options available to her.236  Despite 
this, mock jurors presented with SA testimony found the defendant to be 
less typical of a battered woman.237  It may be the case that although SA 
expert testimony was highlighting the social factors that play a part in the 
lives of battered women, jurors were viewing the testimony as irrelevant to 
the defendant and dismissing it.238  Jurors may have benefited more from 
SA expert testimony if it had made explicit links to the defendant’s case.  
Of course, this suggestion must be considered in light of various decisions 
across jurisdictions concerning the permitted scope of expert testimony.239 
In another jury simulation study, however, more promising findings 
related to SA testimony were reported.240  The researchers varied both the 
imminence of danger (direct confrontation vs. no confrontation/sleeping 
abuser) and expert testimony (BWS versus SA versus control) in a case 
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involving a battered woman charged in the murder of her abusive partner.241  
Results highlighted the importance of providing jurors with “information 
about the (limited) choices confronting battered women in their attempts to 
end the violence in their lives.”242  Participants exposed to SA testimony 
were less likely than those presented with BWS testimony to view the 
defendant as psychologically unstable.243 
Though the effectiveness of expert testimony that focuses on social 
factors remains equivocal, the limited research conducted suggests that this 
form of testimony is promising.  By avoiding the stereotypical and 
pathologized representation advanced within BWS testimony, SA evidence 
may be more consistent with the criteria of reasonableness required of a 
successful self-defense plea.  It is important that research concerning 
battering and its impact on women not be viewed as static.244  Rather, 
reforms based upon the most recent scientific evidence can be directed 
toward reformulating expert evidence to most accurately reflect the social 
realities faced by battered women.245  Future research can also be helpful in 
terms of identifying ways in which expert testimony can be viewed as 
relevant by fact finders. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the prevalence of domestic violence, there is substantial 
evidence that the public continues to endorse a number of myths and 
misconceptions concerning victims.246  Anecdotally, interviews with mock 
jurors likewise support a lack of knowledge concerning victim behavior.247  
Expectations concerning a victim’s ability to leave, her (lack) of passivity, 
and helplessness, oftentimes conflict with the way many victims of 
domestic violence actually respond.  Consequently, difficulties among the 
triers of fact arise when trying to reconcile a particular victim’s behavior 
with expectations concerning “typical” victim behavior.  However, among 
those who work regularly with domestic violence victims, we are aware that 
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behavior that may be viewed as counterintuitive by laypeople, instead, 
actually represents common victim responses to trauma.248 
The goal of introducing expert testimony in self-defense cases is to 
counteract the myths and misconceptions surrounding battered women and 
to explain the dynamics and impact of abuse, and in so doing, assist fact-
finders in evaluating the reasonableness of a woman’s use of lethal force.  
Although this goal may differ from prosecutorial use of expert evidence, 
and varies as a function of the case on hand, the consensus appears to be 
that expert testimony can serve as a valuable educational tool within the 
courtroom.  Thus, while this Article focused on social science research 
concerning the use of expert testimony in self-defense cases, this research 
has important practical implications when considering the use of expert 
evidence to explain victim behavior within the courtroom. 
Simply stated, the utility of BWS evidence as a trial strategy in self-
defense cases is dubious.  At the least, reference to BWS, and/or the 
constructs of learned helplessness and the cycle theory of violence should 
be avoided altogether.  Though future research is necessary in order to 
delineate the specific elements of BWS that jurors perceive as necessary in 
order for a battered woman defendant to benefit from its inclusion in a trial, 
results gleaned from jury simulations provides evidence that BWS supports 
a characterization of battered women as psychologically disordered.  This 
portrayal is inconsistent with a defense that rests upon establishing the 
reasonableness of a defendant’s beliefs and actions.  Jurisdictions differ in 
their application of reasonableness inasmuch as they apply objective or 
subjective standards of reasonableness, or a combination thereof.249  
Irrespective, using expert testimony to explain a victim’s use of lethal force, 
within a psychological framework, risks undermining the reasonableness of 
the self-defense claim. 
Research also provides persuasive evidence that BWS testimony 
promotes a stereotypical standard for battered women.  Consequently, for 
women whose experiences deviate from this standard, their responses to 
their victimization risk being disbelieved because they are viewed as falling 
outside those of “typical” victims.  In fact, syndrome-based testimony can 
be used to help establish that a particular woman is not a legitimate battered 
woman.250  Unless a victim’s experience of violence conforms to the pattern 
detailed within the “cycle theory of violence,” or is consistent with “learned 
helplessness,” the testimony, though entered in an effort to educate triers of 
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fact, will actually be viewed as inapplicable and disregarded by jurors.  
Relatedly, the discrepancy between a particular battered woman defendant 
and expert testimony may more readily be made apparent through cross-
examination and/or conflicting expert testimony. 
Taken together, empirical evidence supports concerns that BWS 
evidence advances a stereotypical and pathological representation of 
battered women defendants.  Despite the shortcomings associated with 
BWS evidence, expert testimony remains an important tool within the 
courtroom.  Arguments that BWS testimony be placed under a “Domestic 
Abuse Syndrome” rubric in order to better encompass the “psychological 
impact on all victims of severe domestic violence,” does not, in light of 
empirical evidence, represent a viable option.251  Rather, efforts to redefine 
the content of expert testimony in such a way that it addresses the 
complexity and reality of the experiences of battered women is more 
consistent with the justification-based plea of self-defense, than the 
individualistic, syndrome-based approach of BWS testimony. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the use of BWS in the courtroom has often been assumed to 
be advantageous in terms of shedding light upon the experiences of battered 
women who kill, there have been many recent critiques that point out why 
this may not be the case.  Empirical findings gleaned from social science 
research supports these concerns.  Nevertheless, use of the BWS within the 
courtroom persists.  This may in part be because BWS terminology 
ostensibly provides a parsimonious framework under which the experiences 
and behaviors of battered women may be conveniently subsumed.252  
However, this framework fails to account for the complexity and diversity 
of victim experiences.253  As a result, the nature and dynamics of domestic 
violence risk remaining obscured and misunderstood within the courtroom.  
The impact of abuse, including reasons why a victim engaged in seemingly 
counterintuitive behavior, can be explained without reference to BWS 
terminology, or because of psychological pathology.  On the basis of the 
research reviewed in this Article, it is important that expert testimony shift 
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from a framework that emphasizes helplessness and individual pathology, 
to one that highlights the context within which some women may resort to 
lethal force.  This form of expert testimony would more accurately 
represent the complexity of domestic violence, and in so doing, be better 
suited to characterize a battered woman’s use of lethal force as reasonable 
and justified than syndrome-based evidence. 
